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Abstract
This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions.
While the impact of ruling party strength on regime stability is extensively studied, we
know much less about when and why ruling party strength can facilitate democratiza-
tion during regime transitions. Proceeding from recent studies that suggest autocratic
incumbents often choose to democratize from a position of strength rather than weak-
ness, I discuss how specific attributes strong ruling party organizations wield can provide
autocratic incumbents with incentives and capabilities to lead democratization in the
context of regime change. Using an original data on organizational characteristics of 161
autocratic ruling parties between 1970 and 2015, I provide the first set of systematic em-
pirical evidence supporting the argument that ruling party organizational features that
promote regime durability can simultaneously facilitate the implementation of substan-




Extensive work argues that strong ruling party organizations promote autocratic regime
durability by containing conflict among the members of the ruling coalition, co-opting
opposition groups, and mobilizing the masses in support of the regime (Boix and Svolik
2013; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Greene 2007;
Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2006; 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Slater 2010;
Smith 2005; Svolik 2012). Hence, there is a consensus in the literature that autocratic
regimes that invest in ruling party organizations survive longer than those do not.
However, while regime stabilizing effects of ruling parties are extensively studied, we
know much less about the role of ruling parties during regime transitions. Specifically,
our understanding of how ruling party strength shapes transition outcomes comes mainly
from qualitative work based on a limited number of cases (e.g. Riedl et al. 2020) or
quantitative analyses that use proxy measures of party strength that are limited in their
ability to capture key attributes of ruling party organizations (e.g. Brownlee 2009; Miller
2020; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012).
In this study, proceeding from existing insights that suggest autocratic incumbents
often choose to democratize from a position of strength rather than weakness (e.g. Al-
bertus and Menaldo 2018; Riedl et al. 2020; Slater and Wong 2013; Ziblatt 2017), I
contend that ruling party strength is both a regime-stabilizing force and a democratizing
force. Although strong ruling parties generally stabilizes regimes, in the context of regime
change they can function as catalysts for the implementation of substantial democratizing
reforms by regime elites in a top-down fashion to preempt political opposition.
In particular, this study draws on recent explanations that suggest a ruling party’s
perceived capacity to influence the distribution of political power in a subsequent democ-
racy lessen incumbents’ imperative to sustain the autocratic rule given an increasing
probability of a regime change (Riedl et al. 2020; Slater and Wong 2013; Wright and
Escribà-Folch 2012; Ziblatt 2017). In this perspective, incumbents strategically imple-
ment liberalizing reforms to avoid relatively more costly pathways to regime change (see
also Acemoglu and Robinson 2005), and when they can rely on a strong ruling party
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that can ensure their electoral dominance despite of increasingly democratic elections.
Although previous studies provide important insights, they overlook the mechanisms
by which ruling parties ensure coordination and unity within the regime ranks when it
comes to furthering liberalizing reforms. While incumbents’ positive perceptions of the
ruling party’s ability to alleviate threats from outsider opposition groups might compel
them to enact political reforms, the prospects for this strategy also depends on the party’s
capacity to facilitate coordination within the ruling coalition. Given that political lib-
eralization can aggravate divisions among the regime elites, which can eventually hinder
the transition process (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991), it is important
to understand which sources of ruling party strength can facilitate elite coordination to
implement liberalizing reforms. In this study, I relax the assumption that the regime
elites hold homogeneous preferences toward democratization when the costs of sustain-
ing the existing regime outweigh the costs associated with political reforms, and argue
that the likelihood of regime elites implementing substantial democratizing reforms is a
function of ruling parties’ capacity to simultaneously solve challenges of elite and mass
coordination during regime transitions.
Accordingly, I conceptualize ruling party strength in terms of three interrelated as-
pects of internal party characteristics: institutionalization, cohesion, and organizational
extensiveness. Institutionalization – defined as the creation of rules and procedures that
shape the distribution of power and resources among regime elites (Meng 2019), and
cohesion are particularly important for eliciting elite coordination whereas organizational
extensiveness corresponding to the parties’ sub-national presence and affiliated social or-
ganizations are crucial for mass coordination. Together these features shape the regime
elites’ capabilities and incentives to lead democratization without spiraling into internal
struggle or acquiescing to outsider opposition groups.
In empirical analyses, using novel party-specific indicators of organizational character-
istics of 161 autocratic ruling parties from 1970 to 2015, I develop a new measure of party
strength that captures the degree to which a ruling party exhibits aforementioned three
conceptual attributes over time. The measure draws on new indicators that are collected
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at the party-level (Lührmann et al. forthcoming) and coded by Varieties of Democracy
(Coppedge et al. 2020) country experts. This study presents the first systematic ex-
amination of how time-varying autocratic ruling party organizational attributes shape
prospects for democratization. The results corroborate the expectation that ruling party
strength generally stabilizes autocratic regimes but increase the likelihood of democra-
tization led by incumbents given a regime change. I find robust evidence that strong
ruling parties facilitate the implementation of democratizing reforms by incumbents in
the context of regime change.
In the sections that follow I first provide an overview of the debate on autocratic
ruling parties and regime outcomes. This is followed by the conceptualization of ruling
party strength, and the discussion of theoretical mechanisms linking party organizational
attributes to a regime’s propensity to experience a regime change in the form of democ-
ratization led by incumbent elites. I then present empirical tests that simultaneously
estimate regime-strengthening and democratizing effects of ruling parties.
Background
A large literature examines the role of ruling parties in maintaining autocratic regime
stability (Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz 2018; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2008; Miller 2020; Smith 2005;
Slater 2010; Svolik 2012; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). Specifically, studies suggest
that ruling parties provide institutional mechanisms that contain elite conflict, ensuring
regime cohesiveness crucial for autocratic stability (Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee
2007; Magaloni 2008; Reuter 2017; Svolik 2012). Moreover, ruling party organizations
also distribute patronage to elites and social groups, monitor compliance, and mobilize
the masses in support of the regime (Blaydes 2010; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018;
Greene 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2006; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010;
Malesky and Schuler 2010; Slater 2010).
Beyond promoting autocratic survival, several studies suggest that ruling parties may
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paradoxically promote democratization (Riedl et al. 2020; Slater and Wong 2013;
Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012; Ziblatt 2017). In particular, these studies hold that
strong ruling parties empower regime elites to make democratic concessions to political
opposition without risking their survival in the office. Accordingly, when the costs of
pursuing political liberalization are lower than the costs of not doing so, regime elites
have incentives to implement liberalizing reforms. Most recently, Riedl et al. (2020)
argue that ruling party strength is “the permissive condition” that compels regime elites
to enact liberalizing reforms in the face of growing pressures for political liberalization.
Central to their argument is the ruling party’s perceived ability to thwart electoral chal-
lenges and maintain its dominance despite of increasingly democratic elections. Similarly,
Wright and Escribà-Folch (2012) contend that dominant parties’ capacity to mobilize
votes ensures that regime elites can continue to influence the distribution of power in a
democracy, which reduces regime elites’ incentives to cling onto autocracy during regime
transitions. Indeed, many ruling parties have remained in power despite transitioning
to democracy (Miller 2019). Some concede electoral defeats and transform into highly
competitive opposition as authoritarian successor parties, typically coming back to power
in subsequent rounds of democratic elections (Grzymala-Busse 2020). Examples include
National Democratic Congress (Ghana), Colorado Party (Paraguay), Hungarian Socialist
Workers’ Party (Hungary), among others.
This study is deeply grounded in this body of research, but it seeks to improve several
important shortcomings in our understanding of when and why ruling party strength can
facilitate democratization. First, existing studies implicitly assume that regime elites hold
homogeneous preference toward political liberalization during regime transitions. Conse-
quently, the arguments primarily rest on the regime elites’ incentives to pursue political
reforms as a function of the ruling party’s capacity to thwart outsider challengers. As
a result, it remains unclear how ruling parties enable regime elites to coordinate among
themselves to lead liberalizing reforms. Given that various factions within the regime
may see liberalization as threatening to their interests and consequently attempt to dis-
rupt the process by removing the incumbent (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski
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1991), it is important to understand how ruling parties reduce internal obstacles to
leading political liberalization. While external challenges can influence elite incentives to
coordinate, how regime elites respond to such challenges is to a great extent a function
of internal party characteristics that structure elite behavior. In the following sections,
I address the challenges of elite coordination by expanding the concept of ruling party
strength to include elite-level institutionalization (see Meng 2019). My argument com-
plements existing explanations by highlighting the sources of ruling party strength that
enable regime elites to lead liberalization without spiraling into internal struggle, while
competing against political opposition.
Second, I push the literature forward by providing the first rigorous systematic exam-
ination of the association between ruling party strength and democratization. Although
Wright and Escribà-Folch (2012) present Large-N statistical analysis, they attempt to
provide evidence by using regime types as a proxy for ruling party strength. Nevertheless,
the evidence suggests that regime typologies perform poorly in capturing the strength of
ruling parties (Meng 2019). In addition, Wright and Escribà-Folch (2012) do not distin-
guish between regime transitions that have occurred due to political reforms implemented
by incumbents and those that have followed from other types of processes such as coups
or mass uprisings in which the event of regime change results from the forced ouster of in-
cumbents. In this study, I address these shortcomings by providing empirical tests using
a new time-varying measure of ruling party strength based on party-specific indicators.
Moreover, I provide more direct examination of the existing arguments by systematically




Conceptualizing Autocratic Ruling Party Strength:
Institutionalization, Cohesion, and Organizational Extensiveness
I contend that strong ruling parties are those that develop a stable and formalized set of
rules that guide the distribution of power among regime elites together with entrenched
linkages to constituencies. Specifically, ruling party strength can be assessed in terms of
three interrelated aspects of internal party characteristics. One crucial feature of strong
ruling parties is elite-level institutionalization, which can be defined as the process by
which decision-making structures increasingly follow a clear set of formalized rules and
procedures (Meng 2019). In highly institutionalized ruling parties, decisions are taken
in accordance with established guidelines that regularize how power and resources are
distributed among regime elites. The regularization of such processes raises the costs of
deviating from established rules and constrains actor behavior, resulting in what Lev-
itsky (1998) refers to as “behavioral routinization”. Institutionalization is especially
important in autocracies because it prevents the predation of the party organization by
constraining autocratic leaders (Meng 2019). In ruling party organizations where elite-
level institutionalization is low, the distribution of power and resources among regime
elites typically follow unclear rules and procedures that often depend on temporary ar-
rangements based on informal personalized networks. Under such circumstances, ruling
parties rarely serve as inter-temporal commitment tools that enable elites to establish
lasting credible power-sharing deals critical for organizational durability (Meng 2019).
Another feature that contributes to ruling party strength is a high level of elite co-
hesion, which is related but distinct from institutionalization. Cohesion refers to the
ability of a ruling party to ensure cooperation among regime elites (Levitsky and Way
2010). Where cohesion is low ruling parties’ ability to rule is significantly reduced and
regimes are prone to elite defections. All else equal, cohesion should be higher in ruling
parties with a high degree of institutionalization, but sources of cohesion can vary. Lev-
itsky and Way (2012), for instance, argue that norms and identities generated during
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periods of sustained, ideologically-driven violent conflict provide ruling parties with a
robust source of cohesion. Nevertheless, ruling parties can be highly cohesive due to the
personal charisma of the leader or primarily because of the continuous flow of patronage.
Irrespective of its sources, however, elite cohesion is critical for the prevention of elite
defections, and ultimately for the strength of ruling parties.
Finally, organizational extensiveness is another feature that contributes to ruling party
strength. Organizationally extensive parties are those that have considerable sub-national
presence and affiliated mass-mobilizing structures that support party operations with
material resources and personnel. Absent these qualities, ruling parties rarely develop
into enduring organizations (Morse 2018).
How much ruling parties incorporate these attributes is a matter of degree, which
varies over time and across parties. Three components are interrelated and at times
they can reinforce each other. While a party’s weakness in one attribute can be partly
compensated by its strength in another, the strongest ruling parties are ideally those that
are highly institutionalized, cohesive and organizationally extensive. In the next section,
I discuss how the qualities strong ruling parties wield can enable them to simultaneously
solve challenges of elite and mass coordination crucial for implementing democratizing
reforms.
Incentives and Capabilities to Lead Democratization
Regime elites initiate and guide democratization not necessarily because they have nor-
mative preference for democracy. Previous research suggests that regime elites often
implement democratizing reforms as preemptive measures to avoid more costly pathways
to regime change or when they consider democracy to serve their interests better than au-
tocracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Albertus and Gay 2018; Albertus and Menaldo
2018; Boix 2003). The existing evidence demonstrates that when autocratic incumbents
accede to democracy, they generally face better post-tenure fates than they would if they
were to resist democratization or replaced by rival autocrats (Debs 2016; Geddes, Wright
and Frantz 2014; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012).
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Importantly, regime elites can safeguard their interests in a subsequent democracy by
negotiating an extrication or by erecting constitutional rules that preserve their privi-
leges in the long-term (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Riedl 2014). Further, transitions
to democracy do not necessarily result in ruling parties’ loss of power. Miller (2020)
counts that in two-thirds of democratic transitions between 1940 and 2010, ruling parties
have managed to stay in power. In these cases, ruling parties can even gain some benefits
from democratization by expanding their social base and potentially attracting external
financial resources (Riedl et al. 2020). However, when incumbents resist democratiza-
tion in spite of poor prospects for regime survival, the modal outcome is transition to a
new autocratic regime in which bargaining for a transition on favorable terms is unlikely,
and the odds of punishment for outgoing elites are high (Debs 2016; Geddes, Wright and
Frantz 2014; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). Hence,
while preserving the status quo is the optimal outcome for regime elites, the literature
provides important reasons for them to implement democratizing reforms when the costs
of doing so is conceived to be lower than the costs associated with suppressing demands
for reforms.
Transition trajectories are shaped by struggles between incumbents aiming to remain
in power, political opposition attempting to oust incumbents, and regime elites seeking
to prevent outcomes that can threaten their interests (Bernhard, Edgell and Lindberg
2020; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991). Hence, in leading democratizing
reforms incumbents are challenged not only by political opposition, but also by factions
within the ruling coalition. As such, ruling parties should have the necessary sources
of strength to simultaneously overcome challenges of coordinating regime elites while
competing against outsider opposition groups.
Strong ruling parties enhance incumbents’ capability to reinforce coordination among
the key factions within the regime in at least three ways. First, an important attribute
of strong party organizations is a high level of elite-level institutionalization, which en-
tails the creation of formalized and reqularized rules of engagement and decision-making
procedures (Meng 2019). Such organizational features provide institutionalized mech-
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anisms through which incumbents can bargain and agree on comprehensive deals with
those that can potentially disrupt the process from within. Decision-making procedures
based on stable, clear and transparent rules allow incumbents to strike deals that can
credibly signal to regime elites that their interests will be protected (Boix and Svolik
2013; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012).
Second, strong party organizations provide institutional tools for monitoring internal
regime factions’ compliance with the terms of liberalizing reforms as the regime transition
unfolds. Institutionalization involves the development of hierarchical positions and proce-
dures that formalize the distribution of power and resources among regime elites (Meng
2019). The hierarchical nature of ruling party organizations enables top cadres to monitor
and exert control over individual party members (Malesky and Schuler 2010). Haggard
and Kaufman (1995), for instance, show how ruling parties with centralized decision-
making structures – such as Kuomintang (Taiwan) and Institutional Revolutionary Party
(Mexico) – have successfully managed gradual implementation of liberalizing reforms by
facilitating legislative coordination. Such qualities help ensure that political reforms are
implemented as agreed. Moreover, institutionalization encompasses the creation of or-
ganizational structures that promote collegial leadership where regime elites can oversee
the actions of incumbents (Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2012). Institutionalized par-
ties hold regular party congresses and executive committee meetings, and operate under
established rules that limit the tenure of leaders. Such procedures prevent predation
by autocratic incumbents and create incentives to respond to interests of regime elites.
Strong ruling parties therefore provide credible checks on executive power as well as on
individual party members, which should facilitate internal regime coordination funda-
mental to managing liberalizing reforms.
Third, the high levels of elite cohesion that strong parties wield make them well-
positioned to remain unified in challenging contexts such as regime transitions. While
ruling parties generally give the impression of cohesiveness in normal times, when regimes
are threatened by economic crisis, rising opposition challenges, or withdrawal of exter-
nal support many suffer from elite defections that undermine their survival (Levitsky
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and Way 2012; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Reuter and Szakonyi 2019). Regime tran-
sitions represent one of those challenging moments that can encourage defections of key
regime elites (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). Elite defections can significantly hinder
the incumbents’ ability to control the transition process in several ways. First, when a
prominent elite defects to opposition it signals ruling party weakness that can encourage
further defections in lower cadres. Second, the defection of prominent elites can encour-
age opposition groups to overcome collective action problems that can consequently lead
to the formation of electorally powerful broad opposition coalitions (Van de Walle 2006).
Third, defectors can simply overthrow the government by unconstitutional means. While
even the strongest ruling parties may occasionally experience elite defections, defectors
rarely attract enough followers from grassroots organizations. In these cases, defections
often remain as isolated events that do not cause much damage to ruling parties (Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz 2018; Levitsky and Way 2010).
Absent organizational qualities that ensure elite coordination, ruling parties generally
lack the capacity to successfully implement necessary political reforms to lead the transi-
tion process. In the context of ruling party weakness, regime transitions are likely to be
hampered by struggles between rival internal regime factions, which can exacerbate ruling
parties’ vulnerability to pressures from political opposition. The Zambian and Beninese
transitions in the early 1990s exemplifies this scenario. In both cases, incumbents ini-
tiated political reforms hoping to entrench their hold on power, yet they subsequently
yielded to the political opposition largely because of their inability to ensure coordination
within the regime ranks (Gisselquist 2008; Riedl 2014).
In addition, strong ruling parties facilitate mass coordination which further bolster
incumbents’ ability to contain pressures from opposition groups outside the regime ranks.
Strong ruling parties’ countrywide presence help incumbents establish longstanding ties
to the masses through which they can effectively mobilize support (Levitsky and Way
2010; Morse 2018; Riedl et al. 2020). Such qualities strong party organizations wield
become especially important as incumbents lift barriers for opposition parties and allow
for increasingly competitive elections. The ability to withstand pressures from opposi-
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tion parties during regime transitions often enables incumbents to maintain legislative
majorities crucial for implementing democratizing reforms. Even when ruling parties
has to eventually step down in subsequent periods of the transition process, their ability
to remain as electorally competitive enables them to transform themselves into effective
opposition parties that can prevent incoming governments from reverting back to author-
itarianism (Grzymala-Busse 2020). As Riedl et al. (2020) demonstrate, such sources
of strength are crucial to compel incumbents to enact democratizing reforms in the first
place. When these qualities are coupled with ruling parties’ competence in maintaining
elite coordination, incumbents are less likely to miscalculate their chances of implement-
ing democratizing reforms while protecting their interests.
In sum, the argument presented here implies that strong ruling parties create incen-
tives and capabilities for incumbents to concede to demands for democratizing reforms
when the costs of sustaining the status quo surpass the costs of implementing political
reforms.1 Taken these considerations together, in the empirical analysis I test the fol-
lowing hypothesis: Greater ruling party strength increases the likelihood of incumbent-led
democratization (conditional on regime change).
Research Design
Sample and Dependent Variable
I examine the relationship between party strength and incumbent-led democratization
on a sample of 161 autocratic ruling parties between 1970 and 2015, subject to data
availability. The unit of analysis is the country-year. Autocracies are identified using data
from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013). The empirical analysis is limited to autocracies with
ruling parties, given that the aim is to explain how variation in party strength influences
regimes’ propensity to experience regime change in the form of democratization led by
incumbents. The data set covers ruling parties that are either the supreme ruling power
or used as an important vehicle for power by the regime (Miller 2020).
To construct the dependent variable, I proceed in two steps. First, using data from
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Miller (2019), I identify regime changes which involve the ruling party’s loss of power to a
new autocracy (i.e. a transfer of power to a new autocratic ruling party or a non-party au-
tocracy) and democratization (as indicated in Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013)). Second,
I use data from Djuve, Knutsen and Wig (2020) to identify democratic transitions that
have preceded by substantial democratizing reforms initiated and implemented mainly
by incumbents (i.e. incumbent-led democratization). The estimation sample includes a
total of 98 regime changes of which 31 are incumbent-led democratic transitions. The
remaining 67 regime changes correspond to transitions enforced by dissidents within the
regime or opposition groups outside the regime ranks (i.e. military coups, mass protests,
civil war, foreign interventions, substantial democratization resulting from an unexpected
election loss).
Independent Variable: Measuring Ruling Party Strength
This study introduces a new measure of ruling party strength based on unique indica-
tors from V-Party Project (Lührmann et al. forthcoming). Although parties feature
prominently in many studies of authoritarianism, there have been no data on internal or-
ganizational characteristics of ruling parties measured at the party-level. Consequently,
previous studies attempt to measure party strength using indicators such as regime types
(Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012), party origins (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Miller
2020), or party age (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011) which are often poor proxies for concep-
tual attributes scholars aim to capture. This study fills this shortcoming by presenting
the first time-varying measure of ruling party strength based on novel indicators that are
collected at the party-level.
As discussed, strong ruling parties are defined as those that are institutionalized,
cohesive, and organizationally extensive. Meng (2019) argues that an important fea-
ture of institutionalized parties is the presence of rules and procedures that guarantee
the organization’s autonomous existence from the individual leader. Accordingly, insti-
tutionalization entails the formalization of distribution of power within the party that
de-personalizes the ways in which the party organization operates. This builds on the
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works of Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988) who suggest institutionalized parties
are ones that have the ability to operate independently of individual leaders. Following
this line of reasoning, the first indicator captures the extent to which a ruling party
operates as an instrument of a leader to further her individual ambitions rather than rep-
resenting the interests of a broader party organization. The second indicator measures
internal party cohesiveness. This variable captures the degree to which party members
display unity over fundamental party strategies, where lower scores indicates less internal
cohesion.
As for organizational extensiveness, I consider three indicators. The first indicator
corresponds to local party branches, which denotes whether a party maintains permanent
branches at the local/municipal level across the country. An increase on this indicator
represents a party’s penetration into new municipalities by establishing permanent party
branches. The second indicator focuses on the scope of a party’s local reach by measuring
the degree to which party activists and personnel are active in local communities. Specifi-
cally, this variable aims to capture a party’s reach beyond formal branches in establishing
stable linkages to constituencies. Finally, the third indicator measures the strength of a
party’s ties to prominent social organizations (i.e. labor unions, business organizations,
religious organizations etc.). The ties are stronger when a party controls prominent so-
cial organizations that contribute to its operations by providing material and personnel
resources, as well as by helping a party in propagating its message to organizations’
members and beyond.
A ruling party organization’s degree of institutionalization and cohesion primarily map
on to mechanisms that bolsters incumbents’ ability to elicit elite coordination, whereas
organizational extensiveness involving a party’s subnational presence and affiliated so-
cial organizations are especially important for incumbents’ capacity to facilitate mass
coordination.
All five indicators are based on the V-Party expert survey (Lührmann et al. forth-
coming). Section 1 in the appendix provides exact wording, clarifications and response
categories for each survey questions presented to thousands of country experts around
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the world. All experts are recruited based on their expertise on political parties in each
country. Once expert responses are collected, a custom-made Bayesian item response
model is used to convert expert responses from ordinal scores into interval scores that
capture values of the observed latent phenomenon (Pemstein et al. 2020). The five
indicators are standardized and averaged together to construct a ruling party strength
index. In line with my conceptualization, this allows for partial substitutability between
the index’s components in that low scores in one component can be partly compensated
by high scores on the other but high scores in all components indicate a stronger ruling
party.
The appendix presents examinations of the index’s validity. Figure 1 of section 1
in the appendix presents a histogram of ruling party strength for all 161 ruling parties
across 2286 country-year observations that study’s estimation sample covers. The mea-
sure varies from −3.09 to 2.37, with a mean of 0. When examined over time, there
is a significant drop in ruling party strength across autocracies from late 1980s to mid
1990s (a period corresponding to the collapse of Communsit one-party regimes in Central
and Eastern Europe and the introduction of multiparty elections in many African coun-
tries). Figure 3 in the appendix illustrates overtime changes in the strength of selected
ruling parties (Communist Party of China, Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico,
United National Independence Party in Zambia). The strength of these ruling parties
vary overtime in accordance with expectations. In terms of convergent validity, the mea-
sure is positively correlated with party age (r = 0.32). When compared to regime type
measures as presented in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), ruling party strength is
significantly higher in party-based regimes than military and personalist regimes. Nev-
ertheless, the measure also highlights significant within regime type variation in ruling
party strength, which would go unnoticed with discrete regime type indicators. Impor-
tantly, not all party-based regimes have strong ruling parties, which is in line with Meng
’s (2019) critique of the use of regime type measures as a proxy for party strength. Simi-
larly, not all ruling parties in personalist regimes are uniformly weak. These assessments
illustrate the utility of the new measure of ruling party strength.
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Control Variables
I control for several potential confounding variables. First, economic conditions might
affect both ruling party strength and regime changes. As modernization theory suggests,
economic development might spur greater domestic pressures for regime change (Boix and
Stokes 2003). Alternatively, economic development can stabilize autocratic regimes by
bolstering state strength and increasing incumbents’ ability to co-opt opposition groups
(Miller 2012). Moreover, short-term economic growth can significantly impact regime
stability by influencing ruling party strength and regime support among the population
(Levitsky and Way 2010). I measure economic development as the natural log of real
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and economic growth as the annual changes in
GDP (Boilt et al. 2018).
Rents from natural resources can also be used to stabilize regimes. Natural resource
income can help fund ruling party organizations or it can lessen autocrats’ need for
investing in party organizations as a survival strategy. Accordingly, I control for the
natural log of a country’s oil production per capita (Ross and Mahdavi 2015).
Additionally, I control for the international context. Studies show that democratiza-
tion tends to diffuse across national borders (Houle, Kayser and Xiang 2016). Moreover,
the Cold War era provided more leeway for autocrats, which generally decreased the like-
lihood of democratization compared to the post-Cold war era (Levitsky and Way 2010).
The international context can also impact ruling parties by shaping the availability of fi-
nancial resources from international donors that can be used to fund party organizations.
I control for the international context with a measure of the proportion of democratic
regimes as recorded in Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) in a country’s region, and by
including a dummy variable for the Cold War period (pre–1990).
Recent studies suggest ruling parties’ founding origins influence their organizational
strength and durability (Levitsky and Way 2012; Miller 2020). Specifically, Levitsky
and Way (2012) argue that ruling parties with origins in revolutionary movements tend
to be especially stronger than other ruling parties. Using time-series cross-sectional data,
Miller (2020) finds that revolutionary and communist parties (organized as communist
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with foreign involvement) are significantly more durable than parties with other founding
origins. In addition to revolutionary and communist origins, I control for parties estab-
lished by military regimes, which tend to be weaker than other ruling parties and more
likely to experience a transition to democracy (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). I
control for ruling parties’ founding origins by using data from Miller (2020). Finally, I
control for party age.
Empirical Model
This study examines the relationship between autocratic ruling party strength and the
likelihood of incumbent-led democratization. To empirically model this relationship, I
estimate Heckman (1979) selection models in which the first stage (selection equation)
models the likelihood of an autocracy experiences a regime change, and the second stage
(outcome equation) estimates the likelihood that a regime change will be in the form of
incumbent-led democratization. Given that unobserved factors such as strategic motiva-
tions of incumbents are likely to influence outcomes in both equations, the two equations
must be considered simultaneously. Treating the two equations as independent can lead
us to overlook the self-selective character of incumbent-led democratic transitions which
is likely to result in either under or overestimation of the impact of ruling party strength
or other covariates on the probability of incumbent-led democratic transitions. Heckman
selection models account for such sources of bias. For the selection equation, I estimate a
probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates a regime change.
In the outcome equation, I run a probit model where the estimated average response func-
tion of incumbent-led democratization is conditioned on the selection equation. Hence,
the outcome equation estimates the likely pathway to a regime change for the cases in
which a regime change has occured.2 In the outcome equation, the dependent variable is
a dummy that indicates an event of incumbent-led democratization.
Selection models tend to work better when one can include an instrument that influ-
ences the selection outcome but not the outcome in the second stage equation.3 Accord-
ingly, the selection equation additionally includes previous number of regime changes in
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a country’s history as an instrument – calculated using data from Djuve, Knutsen and
Wig (2020). I expect history of regime instability to be significantly associated with
a higher likelihood of subsequent regime changes but have no influence on transition
outcomes. The validity of this instrument depends on two criteria: (1) it should be
relevant for predicting regime changes and (2) it should affect transition outcomes only
through its effects on regime changes (no independent effect, i.e. exclusion restriction).
Although there is no direct way to test whether the second criterion is satisfied, follow-
ing Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019) I run a two-part model that has less restrictive
identification requirements to assess whether past regime instability have an independent
effect on incumbent-led democratic transitions (see Table 3 in the appendix). Results
show no statistically significant association between previous number of regime changes
and incumbent-led democratic transitions. This suggests that past regime instability is
unlikely to have an independent effect on incumbent-led democratic transitions.
Moreover, I include log of autocratic regime duration to control for duration depen-
dence (Carter and Signorino 2010). Doing so makes the estimations mimic standard
survival models. Last, I employ country-clustered robust standard errors to account for
the panel structure and heteroskedasticity.
Empirical Results
Table 1 displays the results from the Heckman probit model that simultaneously pre-
dicts the likelihood of regime change and incumbent-led democratization as a function
of ruling party strength and other covariates. The results are in line with the argument
that while ruling party strength decreases the likelihood of a regime change, it increases
the likelihood of incumbent-led democratization in autocracies that have experienced a
regime change. The estimates of ruling party strength in both equations are above the
conventional threshold of statistical significance. This corroborates the expectation that
ruling party strength is both a regime strengthening force and a democratizing force.
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Table 1: Ruling Party Strength, Regime Change, and Incumbent-led Democratic
Transitions.
Regime Change Incumbent-led Dem.
(1) (2)
Ruling party strength −0.232∗∗∗ (0.056) 0.382∗∗ (0.155)
Military 0.634∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.646 (0.856)
Revolutionary −0.049 (0.162) 0.905∗∗ (0.440)
Communist −0.241 (0.201) 0.574 (0.559)
Party age 0.003 (0.002) 0.009 (0.008)
Log oil production per capita −0.009 (0.008) −0.068∗ (0.036)
Economic growth 0.232 (0.452) 5.090∗∗ (2.391)
Log GDP per capita −0.052 (0.074) 0.427∗∗ (0.198)
Cold War −0.420∗∗∗ (0.135) −0.995 (0.683)
Regional democracy (%) −0.372 (0.295) 0.824 (0.625)
Log autocracy duration −0.007 (0.063) −0.143 (0.140)




Heckman probit estimations. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. All vari-
ables are lagged. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood of a regime
change. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood of an incumbent-led
democratic transition in autocracies that have experienced a regime change ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
To facilitate the interpretation, Figure 1 presents the substantive magnitude of the
effects of ruling party strength on the likelihood of regime change. As shown in the figure,
shifting ruling party strength up its full range reduces the probability of regime change
from 13.9 percent to 1.4 percent. For example, a ruling party that is similar in strength
to Kyrgyzstan’s White Path Paty (−2.86) is 11 percent more likely to collapse than a
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Figure 1: Estimated probabilities (with 95 percent confidence intervals) of regime change based on the
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Figure 2: Estimated probabilities (with 95 percent confidence intervals) of incumbent-led democrati-
zation based on the second stage probit estimates in Table 1.
Figure 2 graphs the association between ruling party strength and the probability of
incumbent-led democratization in the context of regime change. Moving from the lowest
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to the highest ruling party strength increases the probability of incumbent-led democrati-
zation from 11.6 percent to 43.3 percent. This shift roughly corresponds to the difference
between Peru 2000 (−2.56), which collapsed after the resignation of President Alberto
Fujimori amid international pressures and popular protests, and Sandinista National Lib-
eration Front (1.55) of Nicaragua, which has organized competitive elections in 1984 and
successfully steered the liberalization process by holding the upper hand in negotiations
with the political opposition (Haggard, Kaufman and Teo 2012, p. 80).
Overall, the results support the proposition that strong ruling parties create incentives
and capabilities for incumbents to implement democratizing reforms to preempt political
opposition during regime transitions. In other words, the findings show that incumbent-
led democratic transitions is the most likely pathway to regime change in autocracies
with strong ruling parties.
Ruling parties’ founding origins are also significantly associated with the likelihood
of regime change and incumbent-led democratic transitions. Ruling parties founded by
military regimes are less durable than parties with other founding origins.4 But military
founded ruling parties have no impact on incumbent-led democratization. Ruling parties
that have originated from revolutionary movements are more durable than other parties
but this difference is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, revolutionary ruling par-
ties are significantly more likely to experience regime change in the form of incumbent-led
democratization. These results are in line with existing theories. The fragility of ruling
parties founded by the military corroborates the studies that suggest military regimes
tend to be more short-lived than other regimes (Geddes 1999). One reason why revolu-
tionary parties are more likely to experience incumbent-led democratization might be the
tendency of these parties to enjoy high degrees of internal unity and discipline (Levitsky
and Way 2012).
Moreover, the results also show that oil production per capita is negatively associ-
ated with incumbent-led democratization but have no impact on the likelihood of regime
change. This speaks to the study by Houle (2018) who finds that oil reduces the chances
that an autocracy will be replaced by a democracy following a regime breakdown. Like
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Kennedy (2010) and Miller (2012) I find that economic development has different impli-
cations for regime change and democratization. Table 1 indicates that economic devel-
opment seems to stabilize autocracies but this association is not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, autocracies with higher levels of economic development are more likely to
experience incumbent-led democratization than less economically developed autocracies.
One potential interpretation of this finding is that economic development might boost
the capacity of pro-democratic forces to push for democratic reforms while enhancing the
ability of incumbents to respond to such demands by implementing reforms in a top-down
fashion. Moreover, the positive impact of economic growth on incumbent-led democratic
transition are in line with previous studies that suggest economic growth in the context of
regime change enhance incumbents’ ability to hold on to power (Haggard and Kaufman
1995).
Finally, the Cold War international environment is negatively associated with the
likelihood of regime change and incumbent-led democratization. This highlights the role
of external powers in stabilizing regimes as well as in pushing incumbents toward making
democratic concessions to domestic opposition groups. Many ruling parties have benefited
from the Cold War when there was relatively little pressure for democratization from
the West. In the absence of external pressures, autocracies with ruling parties seem to
face a lower risk of a regime change. As such, when international donors’ demand for
democratization is low, autocrats might have few incentives to opt for democratization,
which reduces the likelihood of incumbent-led democratization.
I present additional tests in the appendix. First, following Wooldridge (2010), I
run an instrumental variable regression for Heckman selection models to account for
potential reverse causality between ruling party strength and regime outcomes. In the
first step, I use mean regional levels of ruling party strength as an instrument for ruling
party strength in a country. This follows from Bizzarro et al. (2018) who argue that
political institutions are the product of diffusion in that countries are more likely to adopt
particular institutions if their neighbors also adopt them (see also Frantz and Kendall-
Taylor 2017). This should be a valid instrument because it is unlikely that regional levels
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of party strength directly influence the likelihood of incumbent-led democratization in a
country. Results from instrumental variable estimations, which are in line with the main
findings, are presented in Table 4 in the appendix.
I run additional models controlling for region dummies and a measure of ethnic frac-
tionalization from Nardulli et al. (2012) (see Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendeix). The
results are substantively identical to those in Table 1. Last, I run models with reduced
forms of the ruling party strength index excluding each individual component. Results
from the second stage probit regressions that predict incumbent-led democratization are
sensitive to the exclusion of institutionalization and local branches from the index, sug-
gesting that institutionalization and ruling parties’ nationwide presence are particularly
important for incumbents’ ability to guide democratization.
Conclusion
This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions.
Building on existing insights that suggest autocratic incumbents often strategically tran-
sition to democracy when the costs of sustaining the autocratic status quo outweigh the
costs of democratization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Riedl et al. 2020; Wright
and Escribà-Folch 2012), I contend that ruling party strength can facilitate the imple-
mentation of democratizing reforms by incumbent elites in a top-down fashion to preempt
political opposition in the context of regime change. An important implication of this
argument is that while strong ruling parties generally promote regime durability, they can
simultaneously create incentives and capabilities for incumbents to initiate democratizing
reforms in an attempt to preserve their privileges in a subsequent democracy.
In particular, this study augments recent insights into the democratizing effect of
strong ruling parties (e.g. Riedl et al. 2020) by highlighting how internal party charac-
teristics such as institutionalization and cohesion are key to understanding the conditions
under which incumbent-led democratization becomes a likely mode of regime change. My
argument suggests that while ruling parties’ perceived ability to thwart electoral chal-
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lenges from political opposition might compel incumbents to initiate political reforms,
their ability to ensure coordination among regime elites is also a critical source of party
strength that shape incumbents’ capacity to steer democratization without spiraling into
internal struggle. Empirical tests based on a first party-level time-varying measure of
ruling party strength corroborate the argument that incumbent-led democratic transi-
tions are especially likely where ruling party qualities that enable regime elites to with-
stand pressures from outsider opposition groups are complemented with internal party
attributes that promote elite coordination within the ruling coalition.
Future work should analyze the implications of democratizing reforms implemented
by strong ruling parties for democratic development in the post-transition era. A growing
body of literature analyzes how former autocratic ruling parties influence the prospects of
democratic consolidation in the long-term (e.g. Grzymala-Busse 2020; Miller 2019; Riedl
2014). Future work can examine how the modes of democratic transition can condition
the impact of former autocratic ruling parties on democratic development. Given that
most contemporary regime transitions are from autocracies with ruling parties, how these
parties influence democratization will remain an important topic of research.
Notes
1Like Riedl et al. (2020), I do not assume that incumbents always intend to fully democratize their
regimes. Instead, incumbents often aim to keep reforms limited, but initial liberalizing reforms may lead
to stronger democratic institutions that can consequently result in a transition to democracy.
2In a way, this is similar to Brownlee (2009) who estimate two equations independently. Importantly,
however, following recent studies I estimate the outcomes simultaneously (e.g. Houle, Kayser and Xiang
2016; Kennedy 2010).
3If the exact regressors are included in both equations, the model is identified through assumptions
about the residual distribution (Sartori 2003).
4The reference category includes parties founded through elite coalitions, created by dictators after
the seizure of power, and independence movements. Please see Miller (2020) for a detailed description
of these categories.
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Ilchenko N, von Römer J, Pemstein D and Seim B (forthcoming) V-Party: The Vari-
eties of Party Identity and Organization Dataset Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) Project.
Magaloni B (2006) Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in
Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Magaloni B (2008) Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule. Com-
parative Political Studies 41 (4): 715–741.
Magaloni B. and Kricheli R (2010) Political order and one-party rule. Annual Review of
Political Science 13 : 123–143.
Malesky E and Schuler P (2010) Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate responsiveness
in an authoritarian parliament. American Political Science Review 104 (3), 482–502.
Meng A (2019) Ruling parties in authoritarian regimes: Rethinking institutional strength.
British Journal of Political Science. Epub ahead of print 25 September 2019. DOI:
10.1017/S0007123419000115
Miller MK (2012) Economic development, violent leader removal, and democratization.
American Journal of Political Science 56 (4): 1002–1020.
Miller MK (2019) Don’t call it a comeback: Autocratic ruling parties after democratiza-
tion. British Journal of Political Science. Epub ahead of print 27 August 2019. DOI:
10.1017/S0007123419000012
Miller MK (2020) The autocratic ruling parties dataset: Origins, durability, and death,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (4): 756–782.
Morse YL (2018) How autocrats compete: Parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nardulli PF, Wong CJ, Singh A, Peyton B and Bajjaliegh J (2012)
The composition of religious and ethnic groups (CREG) project.
http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/publications/CREG-White. pdf.
O’Donnell G and Schmitter PC (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. JHU Press.
Panebianco A (1988) Political parties: Organization and Power. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Pemstein D, Marquardt KL, Tzelgov E, Wang Y, Medzihorsky J, Krusell J, Miri F and
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Appendix
1 Measuring ruling party strength
V-Party Expert Survey Questionnaire
1. Local party branches
Question: Does this party maintain permanent offices that operate outside of election campaigns
at the local or municipal-level?
Clarification: By “local or municipal” we mean low level administrative divisions that are ranked
below regions, provinces, or states. We refer to offices that maintain professional personnel and
continued interaction of the party with citizens. Permanent offices operate outside of election
campaigns.
Responses:
0: The party does not have permanent local offices.
1: The party has permanent local offices in few municipalities.
2: The party has permanent local offices in some municipalities.
3: The party has permanent local offices in most municipalities.
4: The party has permanent local offices in all or almost all municipalities.
2. Local organizational strength
Question: To what degree are party activists and personnel permanently active in local commu-
nities?
Clarification: Please consider the degree to which party activists and personnel are active both
during election and non-election periods. Party personnel refers to paid staff.
Responses:
0: There is negligible permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.
1: There is minor permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.
2: There is noticeable permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.
3: There is significant permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.
4: There is widespread permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.
3. Affiliate organizations
Question: To what extent does this party maintain ties to prominent social organizations?
Clarification: When evaluating the strength of ties between the party and social organizations
please consider the degree to which social organizations contribute to party operations by pro-
viding material and personnel resources, propagating the party’s message to its members and
beyond, as well as by directly participating in the party’s electoral campaign and/or mobilization
efforts. Social organizations include: Religious organizations (e.g. churches, sects, charities), trade
unions/syndical organizations or cooperatives, cultural and social associations (e.g. sports clubs,
neighborhood associations), political associations (e.g. environmental protection) and professional
and business associations. Social organizations do not include paramilitary units or militias.
Responses:
0: The party does not maintain ties to any prominent social organization.
1: The party maintains weak ties to prominent social organizations.
2: The party maintains moderate ties to prominent social organizations.
3: The party maintains strong ties to prominent social organizations.
4: The party controls prominent social organizations.
4. Internal cohesion
Question: To what extent do the elites in this party display disagreement over party strategies?
Clarification: Party strategies include election campaign strategy, policy stance, distribution of
party financial resources, cooperation with other parties (i.e. coalition formation), and the selec-
tion of legislative and presidential candidates as well as the party leader. Party elites are prominent
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and influential party members such as current and former ministers, members of parliament or
the party leadership, regional and municipal leaders, and opinion leaders. They do not necessarily
have to be the part of the official party leadership.
Responses:
0: Party elites display almost complete disagreement over party strategies and many party elites
have left the party.
1: Party elites display a high level of visible disagreement over party strategies and some of them
have left the party.
2: Party elites display some visible disagreement over party strategies, but none of them have left
the party.
3: Party elites display negligible visible disagreement over party strategies.
4: Party elites display virtually no visible disagreement over party strategies.
5. Personalization of party
Question: To what extent is this party a vehicle for the personal will and priorities of one individual
leader?
Responses:
0: The party is not focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual leader.
1: The party is occasionally focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party
leader.
2: The party is somewhat focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.
3: The party is mainly focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.
4: The party is solely focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party leader.
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Figure 5: Ruling Party strength in selected countries.
Figure 3 presents changes in ruling party strength over time in three selected cases. Th
figure shows that Communist Party of China has become significantly more powerful over
time. The steep increase in the party’s strength after 1975 captures the implementation
of more institutionalized and collegial decision-making procedures following the death of
the regime’s founding leader Mao Zedong. As for Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary
Party the measure drops significantly around 1985, when the followers of Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas has defected to form an opposition party. There is also a significant drop in
party strength in the period leading up to the 1997 parliamentary elections in which the
party lost its absolute majority in the parliament for the first time. As for Zambia’s
United National Independence Party, there is a significant drop in party strength in the









































Figure 7: Ruling party strength across Geddes et al. (2014) regime types.
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2 Overview of regime transitions
Other (N : 67) Incumbent-led (N : 31)
Paraguay 1988 Cambodia 1978 Hungary 1989
El Salvador 1979 Rwanda 1993 Paraguay 2002*
Czechoslavakia 1989 El Salvador 1983 Bulgaria 1990
Poland 1989 Cambodia 1975 Nicaragua 1984
Panama 1989 Comoros 1998 Taiwan 1996
Ecuador 2002 Iraq 2014 Brazil 1984
Croatia 1999 Niger 1999 South Africa 1994
Georgia 2003 Mexico 2000
Bangladesh 1975 Albania 1991
Indonesia 1999 Sri Lanka 1994
Bangladesh 1990 Ghana 1996
Egypt 2011 Mozambique 1994*
Senegal 1999 Kenya 2002
Pakistan 2008 Mongolia 1989
Bangladesh 1981 Zambia 2007*
Seychelles 1976 Nigeria 2014*
Sierra Leone 1991 Niger 1992
Sierra Leone 1997 Malawi 1994
Algeria 1991 Lesotho 2001
Guinea-Bissau 2004 Cape Verde 1990
Guinea-Bissau 1979 Seychelles 2015
Guinea-Bissau 1999 Sierra Leone 2001
Burkina Faso 2014 Guyana 1991
Armenia 1998 South Korea 1987
South Korea 1971 Sao Tome and Principe 1991
South Korea 1979 Spain 1976
Central African Republic 1979 Central African Republic 1993
Guinea 1984 Myanmar 2015
Portugal 1973 Tunisia 2013
Tunisia 2010 Gabon 1990
Soviet Union 1991 Burundi 2005
























* Not coded as regime change in Djuve et al. (2020) but coded as democratic transi-
tion in Miller (2020). I coded these democratic transitions as incumbent-led because
substantial democratization has occurred under the guidance of the ruling party.
In all three cases, ruling parties remained in power despite of democratization.
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3 Summary statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Ruling party strength 2,286 −0.000 1.000 −3.097 −0.624 0.759 2.373
Institutionalization 2,286 0.000 1.000 −1.944 −0.753 0.662 2.593
Internal cohesion 2,286 0.000 1.000 −2.959 −0.763 0.962 1.613
Local org. strength 2,286 −0.000 1.000 −3.733 −0.727 0.799 1.885
Local branches 2,286 −0.000 1.000 −3.679 −0.481 0.712 1.366
Affiliate org. 2,286 −0.000 1.000 −3.423 −0.606 0.820 1.627
Military 2,286 0.047 0.212 0 0 0 1
Revolutionary 2,286 0.136 0.342 0 0 0 1
Communist 2,286 0.182 0.386 0 0 0 1
Party age 2,286 32.094 23.239 0 13 48 115
Economic growth 2,286 0.023 0.093 −0.840 −0.017 0.065 0.898
Log oil production per capita 2,286 7.344 7.999 0.000 0.000 15.849 20.239
Log GDP per capita 2,286 8.079 0.925 5.922 7.368 8.771 11.114
Cold War 2,286 0.462 0.499 0 0 1 1
Regional democracy (%) 2,286 0.281 0.219 0 0.1 0.4 1
Past regime breakdowns (#) 2,286 7.109 6.364 0 3 9 35
log autocracy duration 2,286 3.331 0.958 0.000 2.773 3.892 5.375
Ethnic fractionalization 1,796 0.482 0.278 0.003 0.216 0.762 0.884
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4 Additional Tests
Table 3: Two-part logistic regression.
(1) (2)
Regime Change Incumbent-led Dem.
Ruling party strength -0.504∗∗∗ (0.125) 0.549∗∗ (0.275)
Military 1.352∗∗∗ (0.221) 1.453 (1.121)
Revolutionary -0.225 (0.357) 1.848∗∗ (0.918)
Communist -0.580 (0.491) 1.004 (1.022)
Party age 0.00903∗ (0.00536) 0.0201 (0.0138)
Log oil production per capita -0.0196 (0.0178) -0.159∗ (0.0850)
Economic growth 0.532 (0.981) 10.85∗∗ (5.073)
Log GDP per capita -0.136 (0.167) 0.808∗∗ (0.352)
Cold War -0.931∗∗∗ (0.304) -2.366∗∗ (0.990)
Regional democracy (%) -0.915 (0.675) 1.109 (1.199)
Past regime breakdowns (#) 0.0536∗∗∗ (0.0193) 0.0275 (0.0502)
log autocracy duration -0.0216 (0.137) -0.260 (0.320)
Uncensored 98
Observations 2286
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The first stage equation runs
a logit estimation of the likelihood of regime change. The second stage equation
runs a logit estimation of likelihood of incumbent-led democratization among
the cases that have experienced a regime change. The coefficient for the number
of regime breakdown is significant in the first stage equation but not in the
second stage, which supports my argument that past regime instability should
have no independent effect on incumbent-led democratization. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Heckman probit estimations (Insturmental variable estimation)
First-Stage Regression Second-Stage Regression
Ruling Party strength Regime Change Incumbent-led Dem.
Regional ruling party strength 0.960∗∗∗ (0.0379)
Ruling party strength -0.262∗∗∗ (0.0623) 0.347∗∗ (0.174)
Military 0.140 (0.128) 0.681∗∗∗ (0.119) 0.673 (0.863)
Revolutionary 0.0207 (0.0777) -0.0453 (0.170) 0.933∗∗ (0.440)
Communist 0.655∗∗∗ (0.123) -0.220 (0.199) 0.568 (0.557)
Party age 0.000659 (0.00202) 0.00343 (0.00262) 0.0102 (0.00783)
Log oil production per capita -0.000214 (0.00699) -0.00904 (0.00863) -0.0734∗∗ (0.0363)
Economic growth 0.136 (0.123) 0.0302 (0.500) 5.627∗∗ (2.256)
Log GDP per capita 0.104∗ (0.0622) -0.0733 (0.0821) 0.486∗∗ (0.212)
Cold War 0.0432 (0.0546) -0.432∗∗∗ (0.139) -0.947 (0.634)
Regional democracy (%) -0.340∗∗ (0.168) -0.383 (0.311) 0.788 (0.645)
Past regime breakdowns (#) 0.00731 (0.00649) 0.0278∗∗∗ (0.00918)




Redoes the main heckman probit model using average regional ruling party strength as an instrument for
ruling party strength in a country. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Controlling for ethnic fractionalization.
Regime Change Incumbent-led Dem.
Ruling party strength -0.256∗∗∗ (0.0662) 0.271∗ (0.142)
Military 0.662∗∗∗ (0.106) 0.220 (0.571)
Revolutionary -0.130 (0.200) 0.773 (0.485)
Communist -0.201 (0.217) 0.778 (0.490)
Party age 0.00357 (0.00262) 0.00760 (0.00741)
Log oil production per capita -0.0109 (0.0108) -0.0548 (0.0413)
Economic growth 0.0129 (0.499) 3.946 (2.740)
Log GDP per capita -0.0588 (0.109) 0.471∗ (0.273)
Ethnic fracitonalization -0.443∗∗ (0.209) 1.331∗∗ (0.582)
Cold War -0.497∗∗∗ (0.144) -0.430 (0.662)
Regional democracy (%) -0.277 (0.306) 0.520 (0.515)
Log autocracy duration 0.00315 (0.0712)




This model adds a measure of ethnic fractionalization to the main Heckman probit model. Country
clustered standard errors in parentheses. Ethnic fractionalization variable has many missing obser-
vations, which reduce the number of regime change events. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Controlling for region dummies.
Regime Change Incumbent-led Dem.
Ruling Party Strength -0.267∗∗∗ (0.0574) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.146)
Military 0.614∗∗∗ (0.146) 0.464 (0.715)
Revolutionary -0.0752 (0.155) 1.119∗∗ (0.547)
Communist -0.685∗∗ (0.266) 1.731∗∗ (0.877)
Party age 0.00538∗∗ (0.00268) 0.00490 (0.00693)
Log oil production per capita -0.0117 (0.00811) -0.0416 (0.0357)
Economic growth 0.229 (0.459) 4.697∗ (2.537)
Log GDP per capita -0.125∗ (0.0715) 0.746∗∗ (0.301)
Cold War -0.679∗∗∗ (0.169) -0.870 (0.893)
Regional democracy (%) -1.464∗∗∗ (0.528) 1.343 (1.479)
Log autocracy duration -0.00819 (0.0657) -0.0498 (0.155)




This model adds region dummies to the main Heckman probit model. Country
clustered standarde rrors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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